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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines issues relating to the integration of immigrants, particularly Muslim 
immigrants, into European societies. It first contemplates whether a true European identity 
really exists. Building on the different conceptions of (European) identity, the paper claims 
that a sense of belonging is crucial in helping immigrants integrate into Europe.  The paper 
also argues that identity is, actually, most relevant when it is under threat. The paper 
therefore looks at the nature of Muslim society in Europe and some of the reasons for 
disaffection in that population. While doing this, the paper compares the various models of 
integration in, for example, the United States, Canada and Israel with the attempt by a 
number of EU Member States to find satisfactory integration strategies. Also, the efforts of 
the European Commission to forge an acceptable integration framework through the 
principles elaborated following the Hague declaration in November 2004 are discussed. The 
paper concludes that integration is best approached by creating cohesive communities and 
loyalties at the local level.  
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1 THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION—IDENTITY DEFINED 
There are two factors which profoundly affect thinking on the issue of immigration in 
Europe. The first is that it is a complex subject frequently simplified to the point of 
misunderstanding in the media. One only has to ponder the causes and effects of migration 
(poverty, war, to cite but two) to realise the nature of this assertion. The second is that 
Europe is a neophyte in the handling of immigration compared with other countries and is 
therefore feeling its way in dealing with it.  
This paper looks at just some of the factors involved and focuses especially on 
considerations of identity. The essence of this is whether and how recent immigrants to 
European countries, and especially Muslim immigrants, can retain the best of their culture 
but at the same time feel that they are an integral part of their new countries. I believe 
that correctly handled by policy makers (whether at European, national or local level), a 
framework can be created which enables this to happen. For example, by enforcing existing 
or, if necessary, new legislation to combat discrimination.  
Nevertheless, my contention will be that most of the issues lie at local level and should be 
solved at the level with the participation of immigrants and the indigenous population. The 
absence of community cohesion (which can be used as a synonym for a sense of belonging) 
was noted by Jayaweera and Choudhury1 as a factor in the riots in northern England in 
2001. Conversely, the presence of  a strong local identity in Marseille seems to have been 
an element in saving that city from the riots in the French banlieues in 2005.2 
The attacks on the United States on September 11 2001, although they did not take place in 
Europe, shocked Europeans in a number of ways, and also caused the reflection in Europe 
that it could happen here. It could and it did, in Madrid and London to say nothing of other 
foiled terrorist attempts. 
However, in some ways, the attacks in these two European cities seemed worse than in 
America. The reason for this is that the perpetrators were born and educated in Europe, a 
continent which prides itself as being at the origins of the Enlightenment and liberal 
democracy. Then came the riots in France and the hand-wringing began. How could people 
nurtured in the womb of European welfare caring societies commit such acts? Are they so 
alienated from their respective societies that they do not identify with the populations of 
origin? 
These events engendered reflections on how to approach these issues and the nature of 
European and national identities. Clearly, if you launch bombs at innocent citizens, you 
cannot be said to identify with their interests. Thus the integration of immigrants – creating 
a sense of citizenship and belonging - became a mantra chanted by policy makers 
throughout the Western world. It is an attractive and indeed valid concept especially in the 
post 9/11 context. In Britain there was sense of disbelief that British citizens, born and 
raised in the broader culture of the country and apparently leading productive lives could 
                                                
1 2008. 
2 BBC 2008.  
 commit such acts.  It is not constructive to blame the Islamic madrassas for these ills; there 
are more pertinent reasons why alienated individuals commit such horrors and we are 
bound to look at our own societies closely before holding others responsible. 
There does ,however, seem to be what some commentators have called “the globalisation 
of grievance” at work. By this I mean that the grievances of individuals who commit 
terrorist acts are not necessarily related to their views of the society in which they live, 
but rather their reaction to wider issues of foreign policy and perceived aggression against 
people of their kind. Thus the views of the perpetrators can be said to be based on 
conflicts that are flashed around the world in an instant in a highly reduced and often 
editorialised form. 
The question, then, is whether and how the creation of a specifically European identity or 
if not a European identity, at least a series of identities, European, national, regional or 
local, which are productive and benign, can be achieved. In the case of European identity, 
we need first to determine what we mean by European and what we mean by identity. 
Being European can be defined in many different ways.  
First, can we Europeans be defined by geography? If you consider the political gymnastics of 
determining where Europe begins and ends (for example in the case of Turkey, Ukraine or 
Belarus), even this is not clear. Then you might consider European values as a criterion. 
Here we may be on safer ground because there are certain fundamentals which are 
common to our thinking and I will return to this later. Then there is the cultural element. 
Perhaps there is a European identity for high culture in art, music and literature, but in an 
everyday understanding of culture as to how we live, we are all very different. Take 
language for example. There are now 23 different official languages in the EU alone so the 
term “lost in translation” begins to take on a new meaning. In addition, in relation to 
language, recent research seems to show that people who speak different languages 
actually reason in different ways. According to Professor Henny Bijleveld, a neurolinguist at 
the Université Libre de Bruxelles,3 each language is so differently structured that it 
influences our comprehension of the other. It is not simply a question of translation but a 
manner of thinking. If this hypothesis holds good (and there are opposing views) then this 
makes language as an identity marker even more important.  
My contention, therefore, is that there is not one European identity, nor indeed one 
national identity. Indeed, the motto “United in Diversity” was coined to reflect this very 
issue, although in the context of the immigrant integration debate, it is but a neat 
encapsulation of an ideal. In reality we are all, as individuals, made up of a patchwork of 
identities. These consist of our gender, our language, our education in the broad sense, our 
religion and our rituals which, using the term loosely, can include dance, cuisine and 
ceremonies. We are not even aware of these aspects of our lives that are interwoven into 
our personalities, families and friends in a relatively seamless way. How do we know that 
we share certain identities with others in our entourage? AJ Ayer4, the founder of logical 
positivism, gives us a clue. 
“Each of us has good reason to suppose that other people understand him, and 
that he understands them, because he observes that his utterances have the 
effect on their actions which he regards as appropriate and that they also regard 
as appropriate the effect which their utterances have on his actions; and mutual 
                                                
3 La Libre Belgique 2007. 
4 1971, 142. 
Richard Lewis  9  
 
   
 
 
understanding is defined in terms of such harmony and behaviour… Each of us, 
although his sense experiences are private to himself, has good reason to believe 
that he and other conscious beings inhabit a common world”.  
The key to understanding a common identity is the expression of a mutual understanding of 
the world and the way people interact in it. It is not surprising therefore that when 
someone blows up a train and thereby loses his own life in the hope of obtaining 
immortality, we say that is “beyond our comprehension”. It is almost as if that person were 
speaking another language. “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,” 
wrote Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
One of the first questions you ask someone you meet for the first time is what they do for a 
living. Many, if not most of us identify with our work. We are doctors, lawyers and so on, 
and we either identify with those professions or the organisations for which we work. We 
may consciously or unconsciously try and preserve that domain for ourselves, excluding 
minorities or the opposite sex, for example. Even though the law does not permit us to do 
this, the fact that minorities often find it difficult to access the world of work which 
appears to be so important in the hierarchy of society shows, not that the law is wrong, but 
that law cannot cure all. It is always subject to interpretation. Attempts have been made 
to rectify this phenomenon by positive discrimination. However, as Stephen Pinker5 points 
out “by pitting one group against another, such policies may cause each group to brew 
stereotypes about the other that are more pejorative than the ones they would develop in 
personal encounters”. 
Take another example of the identity process, which might by a leap of the imagination be 
linked to the sense of being European. I am referring to sports politics or more specifically 
football politics. Identifying with a local football team becomes almost a fetish and the 
outbreaks of violence between supporters are witness to the view that football is a barely 
disguised substitute for war or at least regional rivalries. Europe’s internecine wars are 
being replayed on the field and in the environs of the stadium. Regional and national 
identity issues have not disappeared but simply re-surfaced in a different, and it is hoped, 
a more benign form. 
Having reflected on the nature of identity, consider further the nature of what it means to 
be European. Gerard Dulanty writes: 
 “To speak of Europe as an invention is to stress the ways in which it has been 
constructed in a historical process… (it is) in fact a historically fabricated reality 
of ever-changing forms and dynamics. Most of Europe is only retrospectively 
European…. Defining Europe is then fraught with problems, for Europe is a 
protean idea and not something self-evident. It is erroneous to regard Europe as 
merely a region for the simple reason that it means different things to different 
people in different contexts”.6 
Some of the nineteenth and indeed twentieth century ideas of uniting Europe have a less 
than glorious past. Thus, the vision of Europe “uniting in diversity” as seen from Brussels 
might be viewed with scepticism by the citizen or immigrant and might prove to be an 
unattractive model. From Bismarck to the defeat of fascism in 1945, the “idea of Europe” 
became closely associated with the notion of MittelEuropa,7 originally as an issue of 
                                                
5 2002. 
6 1995, 3. 
7 Ibid., chapter 7. 
 economic unity in the mid-nineteenth century. Fascism was after all a supra-national 
ideology. With the accession of the new Member States of the EU and the inevitable shift of 
gravity eastwards, Germany once again will become not only the economic but also the 
political centre of gravity of the Union. As a consequence, the Eurosceptics may once again 
raise the spectre of a German Europe as opposed to a European Germany. Germany, 
however, appears to be anchored in a thoroughly European and democratic future. But we 
have to be aware that old antagonisms can rise to the surface as a result of history. 
However, like the protagonists of MittelEuropa, it seems inevitable that the force of 
economics will prevail in Europe as a reaction to the inexorable economic competition from 
China and India and that this above all will dispel the notion that the European nation-state 
can “go it alone”. As Eric Hobsbawm wrote: 
“(History) will inevitably have to be written as the history of a world which can no 
longer be contained within the limits of ‘nations’ and ‘nation-states’ as those 
used to be defined either politically or economically or culturally or even 
linguistically. It will largely be supranational but even infranationality whether or 
not it dresses itself up in the costume of some mini-nationalism, will reflect the 
decline of the old nation-state as an operational entity”.8 
Let me summarise my thoughts on both identity and its European credentials. Identity is an 
amalgam. It is not by acquiring a passport that one becomes a productive citizen, although 
that is one element. Identity is a fusion of common understanding among groups and a host 
of local loyalties – family, work, region, language and so on. A European notion of this 
identity, whether it is political, cultural or based on values, can be foisted on an unwilling 
audience. But the decline of the nation-state or the rise of the Brussels institutions, will 
probably not make a substantial difference to the way individuals feel about who they are. 
In due course this might happen; but a European identity will not be created in the space of 
decades, more in the perspective of several centuries. Much more important in the short 
term are the developments and policies at the local level.  
As already stated, the immigration discourse has been stirred up by recent violent political 
events. Indeed, my first contention in this paper is that war and terrorism cannot be 
curtailed in the future except by creating a positive sense of belonging and community 
among new immigrants as well as disaffected parts of the population as a whole. By this I 
mean a gut feeling that “this place is home where I can bring up a family and make a 
positive contribution through employment or otherwise”. A sense of belonging means a 
common interest in the welfare of all members of society at various levels.  
My second contention is that identity is not that vital, except at the moment when it is 
under threat. In order to avoid conflicts it is therefore crucial to alleviate any preceived 
threat to identity. In the case of former Yugoslavia what became important was the 
protection of the group (in this case the individual ethnicities in the former Yugoslav state) 
and its history and symbols; there were few immediate advantages in the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia except the notion of independence from Serb domination.  
Building upon both of these contentions, my overarching claim in this paper is that local 
policies are crucial for securing a safe and propserous Europe.   
                                                
8 1990. 
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2 EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 
Some thoughts on the nature of European ethnicities and migration and comparisons with 
countries of long experience in this field are instructive. The nature of ethnicity in Europe 
in contrast to North America is very different due to the historical context of each. 
Superficially, if you walk down a street in London or New York, you may well see similar 
and an amazingly diverse range of ethnic origins in each city. The question is how did they 
come to be there and why? 
Without dwelling on the nature of American minorities, superficially you might conclude 
that there are essentially three groups of people who make up the population of the United 
States. Native Americans who constitute a tiny minority, African Americans, who for the 
most part are the descendants of slaves, and those of very diverse origin who emigrated to 
the United States largely for economic reasons first from Europe but now from many 
different regions of the world. 
In Europe, there are no completely distinct groups of native peoples except in isolated 
regions where their culture has been preserved. At the beginning of the 20th century most 
European countries were made up of diverse groups who migrated from east to west 
starting at the dawn of history and continuing until roughly 500 years ago. There was, alas, 
slavery in Europe but it was on a mercifully small scale. Europeans simply took the profits 
of the slave trade. Perhaps the broad equivalent of slavery in America was the colonisation 
of vast tracts of the earth for the profit of the colonial powers that did not end until after 
the Second World War. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the dissolution of empire left a residue of rights of 
citizenship or residence for the people of the ex-colonies, grudgingly acknowledged and 
usually racially tinged. For France, the peoples of the North African colonies were as 
French as the citizens of Paris or Lyon and enjoyed concomitant rights. The Netherlands 
also granted certain rights to the peoples of its ex-colonies. This situation led to the influx 
of immigrants from these newly independent countries in the nineteen fifties and sixties 
essentially to fill the vacant low paid jobs that native British, French or Dutch did not want 
to do.9 They were highly welcome at a time of full employment and a post-war boom. In 
Germany, the same phenomenon took place not in relation to ex-colonies but with Turks 
who arrived as “temporary” guest workers. 
Thus the first difference to be noted between the US and Europe in relation to immigrants 
of different ethnic groups is that in Europe they are almost all recent arrivals and most 
often from former colonies. So Europeans tend not to single out different minorities such as 
African-Americans who suffered huge disadvantages in the past. They are just 
“immigrants”, to some degree welcomed in times of high employment and resented in 
more austere economic conditions. Of course, not all immigrants in Europe come from 
another distinct ethnicity. Italians, Portuguese and Greeks emigrated in their thousands 
after the Second World War to the wealthier countries of northern Europe. They also 
suffered discrimination. The same phenomenon is repeating itself with the new Member 
States of the European Union. 
                                                
9 Often called the “three d jobs”- dirty, dangerous and degrading. 
 This historical overview does not excuse discrimination but it does lead to the tentative 
conclusion that the approach to resolving the difficulties of integrating migrants are subtly 
different on both sides of the Atlantic. Immigrants to Europe have more of a tendency to 
retain an attachment to their native countries and/or cultures and are not subsumed as 
hyphenated Europeans in the manner of their American counterparts. This is illustrated by 
the large number of North Africans who return home each year or send their sons and 
daughters to their home country to find spouses. The United States has been a magnet for 
migrants for two centuries and the country had immigration almost as its raison d’être. 
Europe has mostly been dealing with immigrants for just fifty years and absorbed them 
initially as a legacy of colonialism. Immigrants to the US have a vocation to become 
Americans; immigrants in Europe in the minds of citizens decidedly do not. 
The fact remains, however, that as a consequence of immigration since the Second World 
War, 8% of the population of Europe or roughly 36 million people are foreign born.10 
Furthermore, the population of Europe, unlike the United States, is declining and will do so 
by 50 million people by 2050. Our demographers and the more enlightened of our 
politicians are therefore telling us that we need immigration in order to keep our economic 
competitiveness. Like it or not, there are economic imperatives favouring immigration to 
Europe. 
                                                
10 Based on the statistics of International Organisation for Migration and Eurostat. 
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3  CREATING A SENSE OF BELONGING 
3.1 The barriers: false perceptions and concentrated immigration 
populations 
It is extremely important for the public to be properly informed about the nature of 
immigration for a successful integration strategy. The media have a responsibility for the 
misconceptions about immigrants that abound in Europe thus encouraging the 
discrimination described by the ILO. They have consistently published misleading and 
inflammatory reports about “bogus asylum seekers” and the like. There is certainly abuse 
of the asylum and immigration system. However, it is not as widespread as the media 
suggest and nor do immigrants usually cheat on housing lists or in the health or other social 
services. A study by Glover et al11 indicates that migrants “are more resourceful, 
entrepreneurial and ambitious than the norm”. This would seem to be a contra-indication 
to the notion that they are “sponging” on the state. On the other hand, the same report 
indicates12 that migrants are less likely to be employed than the native population. This 
particularly applies to refugees and asylum seekers who are respectively 42% and 68% 
unemployed.  
A study published by the Institute for Public Policy Research, London in April 200513 
produced graphic figures indicating that immigrants are far from being a burden on the 
state: 
− Total revenue from immigrants grew in real terms from £33.8 billion in 1999-2000 
to £41.2 billion in 2003-4. This 22 % increase compares with a 6 % increase amongst 
the native born. 
− In 2003-4, immigrants made up 8.7 % of the population but accounted for 10.2% of 
all income tax collected 
− Immigrants earn about 15 % more in average weekly income than the native born. 
− Each immigrant generated £7203 in government revenue on average in 2003-4 
compared with  £6861 per non-immigrant and 
− Each immigrant accounted for £7277 of government expenditure, compared with 
£7753 per non-immigrant. 
In contrast, a report by the Select Committee on Economic Affairs of the House of Lords in 
April 2008 is far less sanguine.14 The committee (which included the distinguished 
economists Lord Layard and Lord Skidelsky), indicated that, in their view, the economic 
effects of immigration are at best neutral and that, in places where there is the greatest 
impact on individuals (housing and schools for example), the impact can often be negative. 
They state, furthermore, that they can see no evidence for the benefits of immigration 
helping to sustain the UK’s economic growth. This presents a far less optimistic scenario 
than is frequently the case. This was trumpeted in the British popular press following 
                                                
11 2001, par.6.11. 
12 Ibid., par. 6.24. 
13 Sriskandarajah, Cooley, and Reed 2005. 
14 House of Lords 2008. 
 publication of the report as “proving” the case for restricting immigration even though the 
report was far more nuanced. 
With regard to those seeking protection through the asylum system, the reasons for their 
relative lack of success in the UK market place are several and are partly due to the fact 
that, since July 23rd 2002, permission to work is only granted when refugee or humanitarian 
status is granted.15 In spite of this, according to a Populus poll published in The Times 
(London) in September 2003, nine out of ten voters considered that the number of asylum 
seekers constituted a problem and 38 % that it constituted the most serious problem that 
the government of the UK has to face. This is extraordinary when one considers that, at the 
peak, the UK was receiving 100.000 asylum applications a year and that only 6% were 
approved, admittedly with others staying in the country either for legitimate humanitarian 
reasons or sometimes illegally. 
The public has been deceived into thinking that immigration in general – which is actively 
sought by the UK government especially in certain categories of highly skilled employment – 
and asylum seekers in particular, constitute a financial and security threat. In reality, 
studies in a number of countries show that either the migration effect is neutral or slightly 
positive in fiscal terms (although all researchers admit that it is difficult to measure). It is 
clear that the media and especially the populist national tabloid press should take a more 
responsible attitude towards migrants. This would go some way in alleviating the hostility 
towards newcomers.  
As indicated above, the House of Lords report highlighted the negative local effects of 
immigration. This is, however, largely due to the concentration of immigrants in crowded 
urban areas. It is the phenomenon that I call the “Rotterdam factor” although it could just 
as easily be called the “Bradford or Leicester factor”,16 that is how to deal with immigrants 
in crowded urban environments with competition for jobs, housing and school places. In an 
ideal world, immigrants would not huddle in inner cities with resulting high demand for 
services in competition with the original inhabitants, but would spread out to other 
locations. Various countries have tried to encourage dispersion, Canada and Sweden among 
them. It does not seem work well. In both those countries migrants tend to drift back to 
the big cities. 
In a seminar that took place in Rotterdam in March 2004 under the auspices of Metropolis,17 
the Canadian inspired network of academics and practitioners, the question was posed 
“how is it possible for cities to influence or manage migration in such a way that socio-
economic disadvantages can be diminished?” Marco Pastors18, Commissioner for Physical 
Infrastructure of the City of Rotterdam indicated that 46 % of the population of the city was 
from abroad rising to 85 % in the poorer parts. He said “We want a society that allows 
people in, but not one where poverty increases and where we create areas of our city that 
are beset by crime…there are people who have been here a long time but are not at all 
integrated”. One can understand his point of view. The majority language in certain areas 
is no longer Dutch and this affects the education process. However, the responsibility for 
this situation is not just on the shoulders of the immigrants themselves, but on the 
allocation of resources. If governments contend, as they do, that Europe needs immigrants 
                                                
15 Institute for Public Policy Research 2005. 
16 Both Bradford and Leicester have Muslim immigrant populations approaching 50%.  
17 Round Table Discussion on Rotterdam 2004. 
18 2004.  
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to pay the next generation’s pensions and fill skilled and unskilled jobs there are fiscal 
consequences.19 
This view is echoed – though from the other end of the political spectrum - by Trevor 
Phillips, Chairman of the Commission for Racial equality in the UK. Phillips says that Britain 
“is sleepwalking into a ghettoised society” and cited the underprivileged black areas of 
New Orleans as a warning.20 Although Phillips’ remarks appear to have been welcomed from 
both sides of the political divide in Britain, his suggestion of manipulating school 
administration to ensure more integrated education was less welcome. “The commonly 
used index of segregation, which measures the number of people who would have to move 
to spread themselves evenly over city, shows that every large ethnic group became less 
segregated between 1991 and 2001”.21 However, this fact alone did not make the 
integration problems disappear. Thus, the solution may lie not in less segregation, but in 
less poverty and by extension more social mobility. No-one talks of the “white ghettos” 
when describing mostly white suburbs. If people can live well, does it matter whether they 
are physically living together with people of other ethnicities? 
3.2 Policy Options 
The key issue is managing migration for the benefit of all and taking a longer-term view. 
Political issues tend to have a short time horizon because politicians live from one election 
to another. However, in this instance we are not discussing fixable social problems in a 
period of ten years, but a two generation perspective. Diversity is unquestionably part of 
Europe’s future (as in other parts of the world) but the numbers have to be managed. The 
kind of seismic shift that Europe has undergone in the past fifty years by becoming an area 
of immigration will certainly cause conflict but that conflict has to be minimised. 
The above chimes well with a Communication from the European Commission22 on the 
subject. The Commission states that: “integration is not an isolated issue. It cuts across 
various policy fields, such as employment, education and urban policies and needs to be 
reflected in a whole range of policies.” A good example is the recruitment of ethnic 
minorities into police forces. This has been singularly unsuccessful in some countries 
(Belgium), and reflects difficulties in recruitment and retention in London and other urban 
areas of the UK. In the Netherlands, the government has financed the Police and 
Immigrants Expertise Centre since 1998 in an effort to recruit police officers from ethnic 
minorities using positive discrimination at the outset but dropping this after resentment 
was shown by native Dutch candidates. Recruiters go into mosques and advertise in media 
favoured by the immigrant communities. In Utrecht, the fourth biggest Dutch city, 
(population 275,000 of which immigrants are 32 %) Chief of Police Jan Wiarda has stated23 
that employing minority police officers is a part of legitimising the authority of the police 
force. He is aiming for 25 % of police to be from ethnic minorities – at the moment it is only 
150 out of 2,700 in the Utrecht region. If this example is typical, it is an uphill struggle. 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 2005, 16. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Commission Communication on Integration 2005.  
23 The views expressed on police recruitment are based on author’s discussions with the members of 
the police force at the Round Table Discussion on Rotterdam (2004).  
 Whether a common EU economic migration policy will see the light of day is still 
questionable. A modest draft directive proposed in 200124 fell by the wayside in the Council 
and the Commission has presented further equally modest proposals for a way forward.25 A 
common immigration policy is the logical outcome of free movement of persons within the 
EU. However, the process has to include a strong integration element not only at EU level 
but a concomitant effort by national and local governments, private industry (which after 
all does much of the recruitment of employees) and non-governmental organisations. A 
European integration policy as such cannot be imposed from Brussels. Based on the 
experience of social services in a number of large European cities (Rotterdam and 
Frankfurt, for example), local initiatives backed by government but mainly in the hands of 
non-governmental or private social service bodies will work better than a top down 
government imposed approach. 
So how does the immigrant “take his or her place in society”? There are two rather 
different groups of people, both in North America and Europe, who are the subject of this 
discourse. Firstly, there are those who are recent migrants, often arriving in adverse 
economic or social circumstances and who may need special help to find their feet. 
Secondly, there are those who have suffered disadvantages, usually discrimination and lack 
of employment opportunities, and who have been in the host country for up to three 
generations. The Dutch use the term “oud komers” or “old comers”. The effects may be 
similar if the issues are not addressed but the causes are different. There is yet a third 
group, namely those who come seeking asylum or other forms of protection and who, 
because of their experiences, may well be in a precarious state of physical or psychological 
health. They need special consideration both in terms of the procedures applied to their 
asylum application and in their integration process should their application be accepted. 
With regard to recent immigrants, the Canadian approach stands up well to scrutiny. This is 
that the host society should make every effort to ensure that the immigrant has the right 
information and help in order to make his or her way in the new country. The Canadian 
government produces relevant documentation which is made available to potential 
immigrants relating to the kind  visas needed, what they should do about health care, basic 
laws, clothing needs for the rigours of the Canadian climate and so on. Most importantly, 
through the Language Instruction for Newcomers Programme, free language training is 
available and immigrants are put in contact with local organisations dedicated to assisting 
them, mentoring programmes etc. In some EU countries efforts are being made in the same 
direction. In 2004, the European Commission published a booklet26 outlining best practices 
in integrating migrants in an attempt to begin forge a European model of integration. A 
second edition was published in 2007.27 Whilst this was a helpful initiative, with 
government guidance, it is probably most effective if these activities can be left to non-
governmental organisations that are well placed to understand the difficulties of 
newcomers. Nevertheless, there are plans for EU funded so-called “European portals for 
immigrants”, that is a one stop shop in key capitals where the potential economic 
immigrant can find out about the conditions for emigrating to any EU Member State – since 
there are, for the time being 27 sets of conditions for migrants to deal with. 
Israel is an interesting and particular case in point. The whole edifice of the country – even 
more so than the US or Canada – has been built on immigration through the Law of Return. 
                                                
24 Commission Proposal for a Directive on  conditions of entry 2001.  
25 Commission Green Paper on Migration 2004. 
26 Handbook on Integration 2007.  
27 Commission 2007.  
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Indeed Israel has achieved the extraordinary feat of absorbing four million migrants from 
100 countries. Former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was architect of immigrant integration 
from the 1950’s when there was mass migration of Jews from the former French North 
African colonies. He allocated funds to create development towns to avoid urban slums and 
encourage dispersion to prevent incursions from across borders and fulfil the socialist 
Zionist dream of a healthy and, at least initially, a largely agricultural economy.28 The 
various in-gatherings in Israel’s history both before and after independence in 1948 
demanded an unprecedented level of government intervention and, because of the special 
circumstances of the country, constitutes an exception to the previous contention 
regarding government intervention and the role of non-governmental or local bodies. 
Particularly noteworthy is the adaptation of linguistic programmes to suit special 
circumstances (for example doubling the language training time for Ethiopian children who 
had arrived illiterate in their own language). Indeed, Israel is one of the few immigrant 
countries to tackle language and employment issues well in advance of an immigrant’s 
arrival. 
The second group of migrants, that is those who have been resident in their new country 
for a considerable time, present a more intractable problem for the host society. This is 
partly because, whilst governments have rehearsed and applied the standard arguments for 
immigration, they have allowed the problems of non-integration to fester. The European 
Commission29 has analysed the trends in national policies on integration as requested by the 
Council of Ministers. The recipe is to mainstream immigration concerns into all policy 
areas. The Commission identifies a number of problem areas that need attention through 
its National Contact points on Integration, as well as National Action Plans for Employment 
and Social Inclusion. I would in fact add that the success of these national policies will in 
many cases depend on their proper implementation in cities and municipalities.  
− Lack of access to employment is the primary cause of non-integration. The reasons 
are multiple. First, being in a job obliges people to conform to certain societal 
norms including speaking the national language. There are exceptions to this rule 
when a person is employed by those of his or her own language group but even 
there, language groups do not work in isolation from the local economy. Secondly, 
earning money and fending for oneself tends to create a degree of self- esteem and 
belonging. This is especially true when a person has hitherto been living from the 
welfare system. And lastly, being employed creates a degree of competitive edge 
and an incentive to train and advance. 
− Language skills and educational attainment are generally crucial. An increasing 
number of EU countries are following the Canadian model and providing language 
courses, courses on civic education and on citizens’ rights and obligations. 
− Participation in the decision making process encourages the feeling of belonging in 
a society which is one of the essentials for immigrants. Most of the Member States 
of the EU have provisions for non-citizens to vote in local and, in the case of EU 
citizens, European elections. 
− Affordable housing and crime control on housing estates are essential to those with 
their feet at the bottom of the economic ladder. In the estates that surround Paris 
and other large French and European cities, immigrant young people with few, if 
                                                
28 Landen and Moshe 2004. 
29 Commission Communication 2004. 
 any, educational qualifications and no jobs turn to petty crime because they have 
little incentive to do anything else. The result is an exodus of all who can afford to 
leave, a disagreeable environment for the rest and an atmosphere of fear and 
hostility towards the host society. In the UK, these go by the graphic name “sink 
estates”. 
Finally, there is a panoply of EU and national laws and institutions against racism. Laws and 
institutions are, however, not enough; it is the discriminatory rhetoric and practices in 
employment and the education system that are at the heart of the problem. The 
International Labour Organisation backs this in its analysis of the European situation (but 
also in other countries of immigration): 30 
“It was evident that migrant and ethnic minority workers face numerous problems 
in the labour market, and that they were in many ways at a disadvantage when 
compared with members of the majority or dominant population. Though low 
skilled irregular migrants rarely have difficulty finding “3-D” (dangerous, dirty and 
degrading) jobs upon entry to industrialised economies, the segmentation of the 
labour market precludes even marginally superior opportunities for their children 
and for regular migrants. Some of these problems are connected with 
disadvantages such as inadequate education and training, lack of access to 
employers, non- recognition of qualifications gained abroad or inadequate 
command of the host country’s language… However, ILO discrimination testing 
studies, in a number of countries showed significant, consistent and disturbing 
levels of discrimination…” 
The ILO has analysed the legal remedies and found them wanting. It has recommended a 
significant remoulding of the anti-discrimination laws, encouragement to the media to 
promote positive images of migrants and multi-cultural and diversity training in educational 
curricula. 
3.3 Distinguishing between Public and Private Spheres  
The Guardian (London and Manchester) printed on 19 September 2004 an article written by 
a black British journalist, Gary Younge. His title was “Please stop fetishising integration. 
Equality is what we need”. His theme is that common sense dictates that the more you 
interact with others of a different origin or colour, religion or ethnicity, “the less potential 
there is for stereotyping and dehumanising those different from yourself”. But, even that 
small achievement depends on the quality and power dynamics of the contact”. Younge 
goes on to point out that German Jews were highly integrated into German society in the 
early 1930’s and that in the American South black women breastfed and raised white 
children from their employers’ families. This did not save them from discrimination or 
annihilation. Younge believes that “the value of integration is contingent on whom you are 
asking to integrate, what you are asking them to integrate into and on what basis you are 
asking them to do it”. He says that integration is not a one-way street but a subtle process 
of cultural negotiation. 
This theme is taken up in the November 2004 EU document now known as the Hague 
Declaration: “Integration is a two sided process in which the full rights of residence are 
granted in exchange for the newcomer’s maximum effort to become an added value to 
society”. To put it another way  “To what degree is integration the responsibility of the 
receiving society, social organisations and the workplace and how can it be measured?” 
                                                
30 Taran 2005. 
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(Athens Migration Policy Initiative). To this should be added the question “to what degree is 
it the immigrants’ own responsibility?” 
Sergio Carrera indicates31 that there is a wide variety of interpretations of integration and 
asks what the dividing line is between an efficient integration policy and respect for 
cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. Carrera sees three different models: 
− Multi-cultural – respect and protection of cultural diversities (Canada, Sweden). 
This model is now somewhat tarnished in the light of experience, because it is said 
to create parallel societies. 
− Assimilationist or universalist model  - equality and assimilation into the dominant 
culture (France). 
− Separation or exclusionist – restricted immigration policy with limited access to 
citizenship (Germany- at least until recently - and Switzerland). 
The main argument to be made is that you have to consider also the realities of living in a 
society when applying any classifications. There is a huge diversity even amongst native-
born populations in many countries. No two families are like another in their behaviours or 
the way they live. The same applies to immigrant families with the added factor that they 
bring with them customs, beliefs and so on, that are perhaps radically different from those 
of the host society. One possible and more realistic solution is to divide the public persona 
of the immigrant family or the way they present themselves to the outside world from their 
private family life. In the former, a high degree of conformity is required: for example, one 
simply cannot choose to absent oneself from work simply because Friday is the Moslem day 
of worship. There may be an arrangement to be made with the employer to make up for 
absence but that is on an individual basis. Or, it is a perfectly valid solution to work for a 
Muslim employer who makes that accommodation. This was the solution chosen by Jewish 
immigrants at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, it has the disadvantage of 
being a somewhat exclusionary process where such communities keep to themselves in 
housing and employment. 
Of course, there are areas where the public persona and private life overlap. This has been 
graphically illustrated by the controversy in France over the hijab or head scarf. The overt 
reason is the constitutional requirement to separate church and state but the perceived 
sub-text is that you cannot fully take part in school life if you do not take gym or swimming 
lessons. That is not necessarily the case but it is what is claimed by some and may be true 
in certain instances. One could have “a girls only” swimming class, but that may go against 
the norms of the school. Furthermore, it is claimed that from a “girls only” swimming class, 
it is a short step to separation of the sexes in general. It is a difficult social issue that needs 
to be sensitively and sensibly handled but should not be insoluble. The issue pits the 
freedom of the individual or group of individuals against the law and mores of the society. 
This has been highlighted by the debate in the U.K. early in 2007 about the demands of 
Catholic adoption agencies to be exempt from the anti-discrimination laws in favour of 
same sex couples. In February 2008, the Turkish government approved the searing of the 
headscarf in Turkish universities thus reversing previous policies. This was greeted by 
vigorous protests on the part of secularists. Whilst not questioning the secular nature of 
Turkish society, it is hard to see that such a move would prejudice the Kemalist tradition 
except that it might be used as a lever to introduce additional comparable measures. 
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 Immigrants should be free to take their place in society but equally be free to follow 
customs that are not native to the host society in private life. Indeed if the custom 
involved does not impinge in any way on the public aspects of life, such the following of 
dietary laws, there should be no problem. There has to be a willingness to adapt on both 
sides. Unfortunately, on occasions, the constraints of religion can place a high burden on 
individuals and even lead to ruptures in families, especially between the generations. 
Religion is undoubtedly a very divisive issue and often leads to a clash between the public 
and private personas with problems of where to draw the line. Let us take the question of 
ritual slaughter, which is common to Muslims and Jews. The law relating to stunning 
animals for slaughter has been waived in the case of both religions in order to permit the 
ritual slaughter to halal and kashrut standards. Circumcision remains exempt from the law 
of assault but female excision, which some, incredibly, claim is a religious rite, is rightly 
not exempt.  The question is where the line is drawn with regard to religious practice. 
In approaching these issues, we should try to make clear that there is a distinction between 
what is in the private domain and what is in the public domain as possible, whilst at the 
same time recognising that it is at the margins of both that there is a tendency to clash. In 
the public domain one should include respect for the law and other peoples’ rights, gender 
equality, respect for the democratic process, equality in education, health and social issues 
and any aspect of being employed or in the conduct of public business. In other words it 
includes the public persona in relation to the receiving country. The private domain 
includes family life (provided that equality is respected), religion and social customs. This 
distinction seems close enough to the communitarian approach, which is that everyone has 
to subscribe to certain core values that underpin western societies. This is what Marco 
Martiniello32 calls “the non-negotiable core values: non-discrimination, gender equality, 
physical and psychological integrity of the person, respect for cultural diversity and 
identities.” There is no room for taking the law into one’s own hands on these issues 
whether through terrorist acts or otherwise.  
3.4 Changing Attitudes through Education and Urban Policies 
Where does this leave the issue of belonging in society and creating a sense of community? 
It does not mean that by albeit well-intentioned policy documents and social engineering, 
governments can create the right conditions for communities to coalesce. The main burden 
for this to happen lies, as I have suggested, in the home and in the educational system. 
Parents as well as the children of the immigrant communities need to participate in the 
process. Otherwise attitudes will persist from one generation to another. It is clearly not by 
passing anti-discrimination laws that attitudes change. The law can give the process a push 
but it cannot change attitudes at will. 
Some Member States of the EU33 have initiated compulsory citizenship courses including the 
essential element of language training. Time will tell whether this has the desired effect. 
Even if the element of compulsion is not ideal, the experiment is worth conducting. It may 
be that what comes more naturally to immigrants to the U.S and Canada – the will to 
become participating citizens – will have to be inculcated compulsorily into European 
immigrants. 
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Access to citizenship, although important in the process of belonging since it is recognition 
by a state of certain rights and obligations, is not the only answer. Many residents of a 
state are not applicants for citizenship. “People come on business visits, as tourists, as 
diplomats, or to buy a holiday home. Global nomads come to work but not to settle. So the 
process of applying for citizenship is logically separate from entry”.34 Bauböck35 considers 
that acquiring nationality implies commitment since naturalisation is a different process 
than being born into a state. Bauböck calls it a process of “re-socialisation”. The problems 
arise when re-socialisation does not take place. Old loyalties remain and in a small minority 
of cases such loyalties lay vulnerable minds open to anti-social or, in extremis, terrorist 
acts. 
Attitudes to immigrants begin in early childhood in the home but also at school. With 
regard to education, common sense dictates that the education can be used in two ways. 
Education can be a great leveller and an integrating factor. Teachers, especially in inner 
city areas where migrants tend in the first instance to congregate, should be trained to 
deal with multi-ethnic classes. Children should be aware of the differences but also the 
commonalities that bind communities together. The process of convincing the public that 
the vast majority of immigrants just want to get on with their lives like the rest of the 
population begins in the education system. The downside is that it might take some time to 
achieve. 
Secondly, the education system must be more open to continuing and possibly life-long 
learning especially for the low-skilled, both for the native population and migrants. In order 
to make maximum use of talent, condemning any section of the population to unskilled 
work for life is not an option in the competitive world in which we live.  
How does this analysis relate to faith-based schools? At first glance faith-based schools 
seem to be the answer to problems posed by, for example, the head-scarf issue. In 
addition, more time can be spent on religious instruction without a disruption of the core 
curriculum. Politicians are faced with the dilemma that the more they push for 
secularisation, the more will be the demand from minorities for their own educational 
facilities. This route seems both expensive and divisive. Separating out children by religion 
seems like a recipe for non-integration when the contrary is desirable. Religion is a private 
affair and should be kept in the private domain. 
As for the concentration of immigrant populations, France may be used as an example. 
Without singling out the French situation as unique, it is clear from the events of late 2005 
and subsequently that there is a serious problem, which has been insufficiently addressed. 
France is not alone in this respect and there have been, over the years, serious racial 
disturbances in the UK. In both countries, relatively minor incidents have triggered riots 
reflecting disillusion and disaffection on the part of immigrant youngsters. In contrast,36 
the city authorities in Frankfurt am Main who have to address the problems of an immigrant 
population of 26 % of the city, have taken positive steps to avoid the problems of the 
banlieues outside France’s major cities. Frankfurt city council has actively encouraged 
social mixing and the avoidance of ghettoes. With volunteer groups, they have created a 
network of leisure centres and training or apprenticeship schemes. For the least skilled, 
odd jobs are found or created so that at least the unemployed gain experience of the work 
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 place. Social workers go into the streets and engage in dialogue with young people without 
waiting for disaffection to set in. Social housing is on a human scale – not more than eight 
floors for each building and is within fifteen minutes of the city centre. And language 
difficulties are addressed with vigour. 
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4  ALLEVIATING THE THREAT TO IDENTITY 
This brings me to my second contention, which is that, when identity is threatened, 
difficulties occur. This can take place in both directions, that is, the indigenous population 
can feel a threat to their culture and the newcomers can be threatened by denial of access 
to the benefits of citizenship. In the Basque region for example, hard-line nationalists are 
said to declare that their blood is Basque and not Spanish, so that even autonomy and 
cultural rights within Spain will not satisfy their political aspirations. (A similar situation 
obtains in the Tamil region of Sri Lanka.) The Basques feel rightly or wrongly that their 
identity, language and culture are threatened by “Spanishness”. The Scots may or may not 
set much store by their national flag but if, on a whim, a law was passed by the 
Westminster Parliament that the flag could not be used in Scotland, there would be a 
furore because this particular symbol of “Scottishness” would have been denied. This may 
seem far-fetched, but it actually happened before the outbreak of hostilities between the 
states of former Yugoslavia. This question has arisen again by the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo, the issue being how far it is desirable to split nation states into 
constituent ethnic entities to satisfy identity aspirations. 
In the case of immigrants, Ted R.Gurr37 lists a number of circumstances where minorities, 
whether citizens of the state in which they live or new immigrants, can feel excluded or 
rejected. These are: denial of access to positions of political authority at national or 
regional level, access to the civil service in positions of responsibility, voting rights (at least 
where they are not citizens), effective rights to organised political activity on behalf of a 
group, effective rights to legal protection, inequalities of income or property ownership, 
lack of access to higher education and limited presence in commerce or the professions. In 
other words, he describes what amounts to exclusion from the benefits of society rather 
than inclusion. Why does this impinge on identity? The answer lies in the fact that when an 
identifiable group, especially visible minorities, are denied access to those benefits, they 
consider that they cannot both be a member of their minority as well as British, French or 
Dutch. 
In addressing the issue of threat, let me return to the “belonging to the Europe” theme. If 
the integration process works well, then the immigrant should feel part of society. But 
which society? In the natural course of events, it will be the country of settlement in 
Europe not the notion of “being European” across national borders, even though 25 %38 of 
citizens of the EU say that they feel European first. Immigrants will learn Dutch or German 
or English not “European”. Indeed Eurobarometer indicates that only 53 % of Europeans 
support the EU and 16 % think that membership of the Union is a negative factor. 
The discourse both in political and academic circles is about the importance of “European 
values”. So what importance do European citizens attach to them? Again, according to 
Eurobarometer, peace (with 52 % indicating that it is important) tops the list. Then comes 
respect for human life (43 %), human rights (41 %) and democracy (38 %).  The rule of law 
(17 %), respect for other cultures (11 %) and religion 7 %) are way down the list. What does 
this say about faith-based initiatives? Even allowing for wide disparities between countries, 
it is unlikely that a majority would support extension of faith-based education.  Indeed, 
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 one of the United Kingdom’s chief educational advisers, Sir Cyril Taylor has indicated39 that 
schools dominated by Muslim children should be closed down and replaced for by “multi-
faith academies” because such schools could become a security threat. Multi-faith school 
building and manipulating catchment areas are likely to be controversial in the U.K as 
similar attempts at social engineering have been in the United States. However, as already 
indicated, education is likely to be one of the main factors in building communities at ease 
with one another. Governments should not shirk from such policies provided due 
consultation has taken place with the local communities. 
It is important not to exaggerate the importance of difference or diversity of religion. After 
all, in 14 of the EU 25 countries 85 % of the people are of the same religion. The issues 
occur particularly because most of the Muslim population live in or around big 
conurbations. It should be emphasised that we are only talking about 15 million Muslims in 
a total European population of roughly 500 million depending on how you define Europe. 
Don Horowitz40 believes that there are many bonds across ethnicities and religion, between 
professional people, colleagues at work, officials and citizens, buyers and sellers. The 
problems arise when non-indigenous ethnic groups are perceived to be overwhelming the 
native culture. This fact needs to be acknowledged and acted upon when dealing with the 
concentrations of migrants in urban areas.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS – GOING LOCAL 
The key to the whole issue of inclusion and exclusion is that Europeans need to be educated 
to the fact that immigration in a globalised world is likely to be in their own interest. It is 
what Adam Smith called addressing not the humanity of people but their self-love, the 
advantages to be drawn. What draws societies together is what some psychologists and 
philosophers call “reciprocal altruism” or in more colloquial form “you scratch my back and 
I’ll scratch yours”. In other words, even though someone has a different background, you 
have an advantage in helping him or her because there is likely to be reciprocation. 
The efforts of the European Commission to forge an acceptable integration framework 
through the principles elaborated following the Hague declaration in November 2004 are 
important. However, the local governments in particular can pursue policies which aid the 
process of building communities: education and urban policies are key areas for action. 
There is no formula that will work in all cases. Public authorities are also not the only 
actors and should not be. And above all, the religious bodies (and the media) have a duty to 
set the tone and lead their communities in a constructive dialogue.  
In summary, local and national identity comes before European identity, which, if at all, 
will take generations to instil. European values are not necessarily universal nor are they 
necessarily understood rationally. There are certainly minimum standards of decency and 
the rule of law but how those are defined changes over the generations, witness, for 
example, the evolution of attitudes to capital punishment in Europe. 
The political debate on immigration and ipso facto the integration factor rests on opposing 
views. There is the X attitude that says that we in Europe need immigrants because of 
demography and the need for skilled and unskilled labour, and that we should welcome 
diversity. And there is the Y attitude that states that we are already saturated, that we 
cannot absorb more immigrants and that is why we are having integration difficulties. Of 
course, the truth lies somewhere in between. If we address all of the factors outlined in 
this paper and draw integration of migrants into the right policy areas, we stand a good 
chance of escaping the worst of the tensions. Action at the local level is particulary called 
for. If the clash of civilisations exists, then it could well happen on our own doorstep rather 
than in other parts of the world. 
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